Emergence - Revision history

Jfromm: /* Overview */

2009-09-06T16:05:15Z

Overview

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	* Strong: 4 levels of abstraction, two causally independent levels of abstraction, each with two causally interdependent levels of abstraction		* Strong: 4 levels of abstraction, two causally independent levels of abstraction, each with two causally interdependent levels of abstraction

	~~The lower~~ level of abstraction implements the higher level ~~of abstraction~~. Russ Abbott has argued in "The reductionist blind spot" that the best way to understand emergence is through the lens of '''implementation''' - emergent properties can be described as a high level abstraction which is implemented by low level elements. The lower level of abstraction implements the higher level. In this sense, weak emergence means the implementation of a feature (by a small number of rules), while strong emergence means the implementation of a new system (by a large number of rules).		While the higher level of abstraction emerges from the lower level, the lower level implements the details of the higher level. Russ Abbott has argued in "The reductionist blind spot" that the best way to understand emergence is through the lens of '''implementation''' - emergent properties can be described as a high level abstraction which is implemented by low level elements. The lower level of abstraction implements the higher level. In this sense, weak emergence means the implementation of a feature (by a small number of rules), while strong emergence means the implementation of a new system (by a large number of rules).

	=== 1. Simple/Nominal Emergence (Type I) ===		=== 1. Simple/Nominal Emergence (Type I) ===

Jfromm: /* Overview */

2009-09-06T15:59:25Z

Overview

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:59, 6 September 2009
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	* Strong: 4 levels of abstraction, two causally independent levels of abstraction, each with two causally interdependent levels of abstraction		* Strong: 4 levels of abstraction, two causally independent levels of abstraction, each with two causally interdependent levels of abstraction

	Russ Abbott has argued in "The reductionist blind spot" that the best way to understand emergence is through the lens of '''implementation''' - emergent properties can be described as a high level abstraction which is implemented by low level elements. The lower level of abstraction implements the higher level. In this sense, weak emergence means the implementation of a feature (by a small number of rules), while strong emergence means the implementation of a new system (by a large number of rules).		The lower level of abstraction implements the higher level of abstraction. Russ Abbott has argued in "The reductionist blind spot" that the best way to understand emergence is through the lens of '''implementation''' - emergent properties can be described as a high level abstraction which is implemented by low level elements. The lower level of abstraction implements the higher level. In this sense, weak emergence means the implementation of a feature (by a small number of rules), while strong emergence means the implementation of a new system (by a large number of rules).

	=== 1. Simple/Nominal Emergence (Type I) ===		=== 1. Simple/Nominal Emergence (Type I) ===

Jfromm: /* Overview */

2009-09-06T15:57:33Z

Overview

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	* Multiple: 3 levels of abstraction, a third level of abstraction indicates the appearance of a new system		* Multiple: 3 levels of abstraction, a third level of abstraction indicates the appearance of a new system
	* Strong: 4 levels of abstraction, two causally independent levels of abstraction, each with two causally interdependent levels of abstraction		* Strong: 4 levels of abstraction, two causally independent levels of abstraction, each with two causally interdependent levels of abstraction

			Russ Abbott has argued in "The reductionist blind spot" that the best way to understand emergence is through the lens of '''implementation''' - emergent properties can be described as a high level abstraction which is implemented by low level elements. The lower level of abstraction implements the higher level. In this sense, weak emergence means the implementation of a feature (by a small number of rules), while strong emergence means the implementation of a new system (by a large number of rules).

	=== 1. Simple/Nominal Emergence (Type I) ===		=== 1. Simple/Nominal Emergence (Type I) ===

Jfromm: /* Articles and Papers */

2009-09-05T20:13:33Z

Articles and Papers

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	* [http://arxiv.org/abs/0707.4198 Reductionism, emergence, and levels of abstractions]		* [http://arxiv.org/abs/0707.4198 Reductionism, emergence, and levels of abstractions]
	* [http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0602045 Emergence Explained], also [http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/images/9/95/Emergence_Explained-_Abstractions.pdf here]		* [http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0602045 Emergence Explained], also [http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/images/9/95/Emergence_Explained-_Abstractions.pdf here]
			* [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004540/ The reductionist blind spot]

	David J. Chalmers		David J. Chalmers

Jfromm: /* Introduction */

2009-09-04T22:42:53Z

Introduction

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 An emergent behavior is not imposed from the outside by a central controller or organizer, it results solely from the interactions between the agents. Emergence is a characteristic feature of many [[Complex System|complex]] and [[Self-Organization|self-organizing]] systems. A [http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/11/4/reviews/squazzoni.html JASSS review] of an emergence book says that "90% of papers on complexity and social simulation explicitly refer to emergence, i.e. emergent processes, properties, dynamics, and patterns". Emergence and self-organization seem to be a contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics, which says that organization and order can not increase in isolated systems. They are possible because they usually happen in open systems, which extract information and order out of the environment and produce waste (import of order/information and export of disorder/entropy). The process of self-organization refers to the boundary between system and environment, the process of emergence involves the microscopic-macroscopic boundary between the individual and the collective group.
-Already Aristotle knew emergence:
+Already Aristotle knew emergence: he said the whole is sometimes more than the sum of its parts (He considered the question of unity for aggregated things "which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts", Aristotle Metaphysics Book VIII, Chapter 6). And Hamlet said, "There is more in heaven and earth, Horatio, than is dreamed of in your philosophy."  Perhaps this is not what Shakespeare had in mind, but in complexity theory, the whole is typically more than the parts. For example if we take a team or group, and remove all the members, we are left with the common intentions and beliefs (for example the common vision or the shared goal), which are abstract and immaterial, but have a profound effect. '''Do we get the essence of "emergence" if we take the whole minus the parts?'''
 == Types and Forms ==

Jfromm: /* Introduction */

2009-09-04T22:42:27Z

Introduction

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	An emergent behavior is not imposed from the outside by a central controller or organizer, it results solely from the interactions between the agents. Emergence is a characteristic feature of many [[Complex System\|complex]] and [[Self-Organization\|self-organizing]] systems. A [http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/11/4/reviews/squazzoni.html JASSS review] of an emergence book says that "90% of papers on complexity and social simulation explicitly refer to emergence, i.e. emergent processes, properties, dynamics, and patterns". Emergence and self-organization seem to be a contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics, which says that organization and order can not increase in isolated systems. They are possible because they usually happen in open systems, which extract information and order out of the environment and produce waste (import of order/information and export of disorder/entropy). The process of self-organization refers to the boundary between system and environment, the process of emergence involves the microscopic-macroscopic boundary between the individual and the collective group.		An emergent behavior is not imposed from the outside by a central controller or organizer, it results solely from the interactions between the agents. Emergence is a characteristic feature of many [[Complex System\|complex]] and [[Self-Organization\|self-organizing]] systems. A [http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/11/4/reviews/squazzoni.html JASSS review] of an emergence book says that "90% of papers on complexity and social simulation explicitly refer to emergence, i.e. emergent processes, properties, dynamics, and patterns". Emergence and self-organization seem to be a contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics, which says that organization and order can not increase in isolated systems. They are possible because they usually happen in open systems, which extract information and order out of the environment and produce waste (import of order/information and export of disorder/entropy). The process of self-organization refers to the boundary between system and environment, the process of emergence involves the microscopic-macroscopic boundary between the individual and the collective group.

			Already Aristotle knew emergence:
			he said the whole is sometimes more
			than the sum of its parts (He considered the question
			of unity for aggregated things "which have
			several parts and in which the
			totality is not, as it were, a mere
			heap, but the whole is something
			besides the parts", Aristotle Metaphysics Book VIII, Chapter 6)
			And Hamlet said, "There is more in heaven and earth, Horatio,
			than is dreamed of in your philosophy." Perhaps this is
			not what Shakespeare had in mind, but in complexity theory,
			the whole is typically more than the parts. For example if we take a team or
			group, and remove all the members, we are left with the common intentions
			and beliefs (for example the common vision or the shared goal), which are
			abstract and immaterial, but have a profound effect.
			'''Do we get the essence of "emergence" if we
			take the whole minus the parts?'''

	== Types and Forms ==		== Types and Forms ==

Jfromm: /* Overview */

2009-07-07T08:23:45Z

Overview

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	\|}		\|}

	The different types and classes of [[Emergence\|emergence]] describe different causal relationships between higher and lower levels of abstractions.		The different types and classes of [[Emergence\|emergence]] describe different causal relationships between higher and lower [[Level_of_Abstraction\|levels of abstractions]].

	* Intentional: Only one causally independent level of abstraction, i.e. causal influences are contained in only one level of abstraction		* Intentional: Only one causally independent level of abstraction, i.e. causal influences are contained in only one level of abstraction

Jfromm: /* Overview */

2009-07-07T08:22:19Z

Overview

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:22, 7 July 2009
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	\|}		\|}

			The different types and classes of [[Emergence\|emergence]] describe different causal relationships between higher and lower levels of abstractions.

			* Intentional: Only one causally independent level of abstraction, i.e. causal influences are contained in only one level of abstraction
			* Weak: 2 levels of abstraction, two causally interdependent levels of abstraction, the level of the group and the level of the individual agent
			* Multiple: 3 levels of abstraction, a third level of abstraction indicates the appearance of a new system
			* Strong: 4 levels of abstraction, two causally independent levels of abstraction, each with two causally interdependent levels of abstraction

	=== 1. Simple/Nominal Emergence (Type I) ===		=== 1. Simple/Nominal Emergence (Type I) ===

Jfromm: /* Overview */

2009-07-07T08:14:01Z

Overview

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	{\| border="0" cellpadding="5" width="100%"		{\| border="0" cellpadding="5" width="100%"
	\|-		\|-
	! bgcolor="#70b0e0" width="25%" align="left" \| Type and Name		! bgcolor="#70b0e0" width="20%" align="left" \| Type and Name
	! bgcolor="#eedd90" width="25%" align="left" \| Roles		! bgcolor="#eedd90" width="20%" align="left" \| Roles
	! bgcolor="#bbbbbb" width="25%" align="left" \| Frequency		! bgcolor="#bbbbbb" width="20%" align="left" \| Frequency
	! bgcolor="#77bb99" align="left" \| Predictability		! bgcolor="#77bb99" width="20%" align="left" \| Predictability
			! bgcolor="#99bb77" width="20%" align="left" \| Levels of Abstraction
	\|-		\|-
	\| bgcolor="#80c0ff" valign="top" \|		\| bgcolor="#80c0ff" valign="top" \|
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	not predictable (chaotic) <BR>		not predictable (chaotic) <BR>
	not predictable, even in principle <BR>		not predictable, even in principle <BR>

			\| bgcolor="#aacc88" valign="top" \|
			one <BR>
			two <BR>
			three <BR>
			four <BR>

	\|}		\|}

Jfromm: /* 4. Strong Emergence (Type IV) */

2009-06-14T12:02:55Z

4. Strong Emergence (Type IV)

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	[[Image:Code.gif\|left\|Strong Emergence]] Bedau defines strong emergence as inexplicable emergence with downward causation, where irreducible and inexplicable causal powers from the macro to micro states exist. For example, Bedau would say that consciousness is strongly emergent if some large-scale macroscopic pattern related to conscious thoughts would inexplicably influence the microscopic patterns of individual neurons. In his paper [http://people.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/principia.pdf Downward causation and autonomy in weak emergence] he says "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in terms of the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities; they are primitive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplicably with the existence of certain macro-level entitites." He admits himself that this concept is scientifically irrelevant and no essentially examples exist.		[[Image:Code.gif\|left\|Strong Emergence]] Bedau defines strong emergence as inexplicable emergence with downward causation, where irreducible and inexplicable causal powers from the macro to micro states exist. For example, Bedau would say that consciousness is strongly emergent if some large-scale macroscopic pattern related to conscious thoughts would inexplicably influence the microscopic patterns of individual neurons. In his paper [http://people.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/principia.pdf Downward causation and autonomy in weak emergence] he says "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in terms of the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities; they are primitive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplicably with the existence of certain macro-level entitites." He admits himself that this concept is scientifically irrelevant and no essentially examples exist.

	Contrary to Bedau and others, we define "strong emergence" here as the appearance of a new code, as the emergence of a new system, as [[Supervenience\|supervenience]] without downward- or upward-causation. The strongest possible sense of emergence is related to [[Supervenience\|supervenience]], the weakest form of causal dependence. The stronger the emergence, the weaker the causal dependence. The strong form is not predictable, even in principle, because it describes the appearance of a new [[Code\|code]] or completely new [[System\|system]] in a multi-level or multi-scale system with many levels. Combinatorial explosion renders any attempt of explaining emergent macroscopic, high-level phenomena in terms of microscopic low-level phenomena useless and futile. An intermediate or mesoscopic level often protects the macroscopic level from the microscopic level, i.e. the microscopic level is irrelevant to the behavior of the macroscopic level. Therefore strong emergence can be considered as crossing the barrier of relevance.		Contrary to Bedau and others, we define "strong emergence" here as the appearance of a new code, as the emergence of a new system, as [[Supervenience\|supervenience]] without downward- or upward-causation. It occurs if high-level patterns form the building block for a new system. The strongest possible sense of emergence is related to [[Supervenience\|supervenience]], the weakest form of causal dependence. The stronger the emergence, the weaker the causal dependence. The strong form is not predictable, even in principle, because it describes the appearance of a new [[Code\|code]] or completely new [[System\|system]] in a multi-level or multi-scale system with many levels. Combinatorial explosion renders any attempt of explaining emergent macroscopic, high-level phenomena in terms of microscopic low-level phenomena useless and futile. An intermediate or mesoscopic level often protects the macroscopic level from the microscopic level, i.e. the microscopic level is irrelevant to the behavior of the macroscopic level. Therefore strong emergence can be considered as crossing the barrier of relevance.

	Strong emergence is very rare, and is normally the result of a long [[evolution\|evolutionary process]], or the result of deliberate and intentional design. Classic examples for strong emergence are the appearance of life and living systems through the emergence of the genetic code, and the appearance of culture and cultural systems through the emergence of memetic code (i.e. linguistic codes and languages in general). In both cases, completely new evolutionary or [[Complex Adaptive System\|complex adaptive systems]] appeared, which are subject to their own [[Evolution\|evolution]].		Strong emergence is very rare, and is normally the result of a long [[evolution\|evolutionary process]], or the result of deliberate and intentional design. Classic examples for strong emergence are the appearance of life and living systems through the emergence of the genetic code, and the appearance of culture and cultural systems through the emergence of memetic code (i.e. linguistic codes and languages in general). In both cases, completely new evolutionary or [[Complex Adaptive System\|complex adaptive systems]] appeared, which are subject to their own [[Evolution\|evolution]].

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:02, 14 June 2009
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	[[Image:Code.gif\|left\|Strong Emergence]] Bedau defines strong emergence as inexplicable emergence with downward causation, where irreducible and inexplicable causal powers from the macro to micro states exist. For example, Bedau would say that consciousness is strongly emergent if some large-scale macroscopic pattern related to conscious thoughts would inexplicably influence the microscopic patterns of individual neurons. In his paper [http://people.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/principia.pdf Downward causation and autonomy in weak emergence] he says "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in terms of the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities; they are primitive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplicably with the existence of certain macro-level entitites." He admits himself that this concept is scientifically irrelevant and no essentially examples exist.		[[Image:Code.gif\|left\|Strong Emergence]] Bedau defines strong emergence as inexplicable emergence with downward causation, where irreducible and inexplicable causal powers from the macro to micro states exist. For example, Bedau would say that consciousness is strongly emergent if some large-scale macroscopic pattern related to conscious thoughts would inexplicably influence the microscopic patterns of individual neurons. In his paper [http://people.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/principia.pdf Downward causation and autonomy in weak emergence] he says "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in terms of the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities; they are primitive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplicably with the existence of certain macro-level entitites." He admits himself that this concept is scientifically irrelevant and no essentially examples exist.

	Contrary to Bedau and others, we define "strong emergence" here as the appearance of a new code, as the emergence of a new system, as [[Supervenience\|supervenience]] without downward- or upward-causation. The strongest possible sense of emergence is related to [[Supervenience\|supervenience]], the weakest form of causal dependence. The stronger the emergence, the weaker the causal dependence. The strong form is not predictable, even in principle, because it describes the appearance of a new [[Code\|code]] or completely new [[System\|system]] in a multi-level or multi-scale system with many levels. Combinatorial explosion renders any attempt of explaining emergent macroscopic, high-level phenomena in terms of microscopic low-level phenomena useless and futile. An intermediate or mesoscopic level often protects the macroscopic level from the microscopic level, i.e. the microscopic level is irrelevant to the behavior of the macroscopic level. Therefore strong emergence can be considered as crossing the barrier of relevance.		Contrary to Bedau and others, we define "strong emergence" here as the appearance of a new code, as the emergence of a new system, as [[Supervenience\|supervenience]] without downward- or upward-causation. It occurs if high-level patterns form the building block for a new system. The strongest possible sense of emergence is related to [[Supervenience\|supervenience]], the weakest form of causal dependence. The stronger the emergence, the weaker the causal dependence. The strong form is not predictable, even in principle, because it describes the appearance of a new [[Code\|code]] or completely new [[System\|system]] in a multi-level or multi-scale system with many levels. Combinatorial explosion renders any attempt of explaining emergent macroscopic, high-level phenomena in terms of microscopic low-level phenomena useless and futile. An intermediate or mesoscopic level often protects the macroscopic level from the microscopic level, i.e. the microscopic level is irrelevant to the behavior of the macroscopic level. Therefore strong emergence can be considered as crossing the barrier of relevance.

	Strong emergence is very rare, and is normally the result of a long [[evolution\|evolutionary process]], or the result of deliberate and intentional design. Classic examples for strong emergence are the appearance of life and living systems through the emergence of the genetic code, and the appearance of culture and cultural systems through the emergence of memetic code (i.e. linguistic codes and languages in general). In both cases, completely new evolutionary or [[Complex Adaptive System\|complex adaptive systems]] appeared, which are subject to their own [[Evolution\|evolution]].		Strong emergence is very rare, and is normally the result of a long [[evolution\|evolutionary process]], or the result of deliberate and intentional design. Classic examples for strong emergence are the appearance of life and living systems through the emergence of the genetic code, and the appearance of culture and cultural systems through the emergence of memetic code (i.e. linguistic codes and languages in general). In both cases, completely new evolutionary or [[Complex Adaptive System\|complex adaptive systems]] appeared, which are subject to their own [[Evolution\|evolution]].